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The very challenging issue for intelligent agents is "do what they should do". 
The BD! architecture is presented to solve this challenge. The main difficult for 
this architecture is the formalizing problem. In this paper, we discuss the 
procedure descriptive framework, which presents a method for formalizing BD! 
architecture. We a present decision model for intelligent agents in this 
procedure descriptive framework. This research shows how an agent to 
generate beliefs and make decisions by using its current beliefs. 
1. Introduction 
Many existing and potential industrial and commercial applications for 
intelligent agents (lAs) are described in many literatures (e.g., see [12]). Such 
applications tum out one challenging issue "do what intelligent agents should do 
to gradually meet their design objectives", where gradually meet means 
intelligent agents need time to grow to maturity. For example, an information 
filtering agent [8] will gradually improve its performance as it receives more and 
more feedback from its users. 
Many mental-level models are proposed to represent and reason about 
agents' environments. Three mental components (e.g., belief, intentions, and 
desires) were used in [9]. An interpreter was developed in [15] that can 
implement behavior that is specified using notions such as knowledge and goals. 
An agent oriented programming language was presented in [16] according to the 
notions of belief and commitment. 
What the above structures Jack is the notion of decision criterion under 
uncertainty [I]. Some researchers have done some works for uncertainties [17] 
[14] [2][6]. The research presented in this paper also addresses the uncertainty 
criterion. 
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In order to select the correct actions in the environments, which contain 
uncertainties, an IA must have ability to perceive its environment to generate its 
beliefs. In applications, an [A's beliefs are not known a priori and have to be 
estimated on-line based on its knowledge and information (such as the message it 
receives from other potential agents, and the observation it gets from its local 
sensors). The above researchers emphasize more what the beliefs are than how 
the beliefs are generated. 
The motivation in this paper is to continue developing the procedure 
descriptive framework (PDF) [6], in which we would like to gain a sound 
understanding of how an IA can generate its beliefs and make decisions. We 
would also like to show what lAs should do under uncertain environments to 
gradually meet their design objectives. 
2. BeHef Generation 
The possible information for an IA includes events it observes and messages 
it receives [5]. An IA could see events about the current world by using its local 
sensors. In this research, we use Pw'lf) to abstract the event that an IA observes, 
which depends on the local state I appearing in its local sensors. We call PWA(f) 
the observation made by an IA itself, where the observation is driven by the 
states of the possible worlds. In this paper, we assume that the current state does 
not change during one loop of the process of perceiving environments, and thus 
we do not attach a time factor to PWA(f). The observation, however, is generally 
vague, and the IA hopes to rely on other agents' messages. 
After a subject agent (the agent of main discussion, who will organize the 
problem solving) sends its request to other potential agents (or its observer 
agents), it expects their replies. In most cases, however, the subject agent cannot 
predict when the information will arrive, or indeed ensure that every potential 
agent will send back information in reply to its requests. For this situation, the 
subject IA could use a set 8, to describe the agents who have sent back the 
information at a time point t. We call the set 8, the group of cooperated agents 
at time t. The subject agent will consider two kinds of factors when it uses its 
observation and the messages provided by the group of cooperated agents: the 
uncertainties contained in the messages, and the conflicts between the 
observation and messages, where, a message (or an agent) is said to be a conflict 
message (or a conflict agent) if the intersection between the massage and the 
observation is empty. 
The observation and messages usually are subsets of the set of possible 
worlds, i.e., the agents believe that the true world state is in the subset, but they 
do not know which world state it is. For the research in the uncertainty world, 
people always assume that the true world state absolutely belongs to the 
observation, so they usually cast away all of the conflict agents' contributions. 
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In the intelligent agent world. however, the observation is just a lo::al 
observation (a set oflocal states) [7]. In this research, we do not cast away all of 
the conflicts, and we expect agents to have the ability of overlooking the global 
picture. It, however, is difficult to do so, because the conflict messages cmmot be 
described by local knowledge. Instead of describing the conflict messages, in the 
procedure descriptive framework [6), we re-evaluate agents by transferring 
trustworthy degrees from conflict agents to the related non-conflict agents. 
We use an interval structure to describe the uncertainties contained in the 
messages. Instead of representing the conflict messages, we use trustworthy 
degrees to describe how the subject IA trusts other agents' messages, and an 
equivalence relation to characterize the dependencies among other agents. The 
equivalence relation reveals the fact that agents with similarities of problem 
solving approaches are related, and must be put into the same equivalence class. 
More formally, we use a finite set Wto illustrate the possible worlds (states), 
and a finite set e to represent other potential agents. A prior probability 
distribution PrA on e is used to characterize the trustworthy degrees of the other 
agents, and an equivalence relation R on e is used to describe the knowledge 
about the similarities of problem solving approaches. The equivalence relation R 
could determine a partition of e, i.e., e can be divided into some equivalence 
classes (the agents in the same equivalence class have similar problem solving 
approaches). 
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Based on the above assumptions, the subject lA's belief about the possible 
information and the knowledge of the group of cooperated agents at time twill 
be represented by a pair BIKI =<Prl,-j, B[.l>, in which 
I)Pr'j is a posterior probability on Elf, which could be induced by transfer 
prior probability Pr,.l from some cooperated conflict agents to its related agents, 
2)Multi-set valued mapping BIA from 21V to 2°1 is an interval structure, which 
fuses all of the possible information at time t, and 
3)El[ <;;;;El is the group of cooperated agents at time t. 
Figure 1 shows the process of perceive environments and make decisions in 
an intelligent agent. As this figure illustrates, there are several main components 
to the PDF: 
.. A belief revision function, b,j; which takes observations and messages to 
determine the new group of cooperated agents El[, and the random set (PrA, 
Ct). The feedback information will be used to update PrA-
.. A pair of <Pr[A , BIA>' representing the belief of the agent. It describes 
current environment. The belief will be determined by the brJfunction. 
.. A ji/sion function, which generates a number function (Dempster-Shafer 
mass function m[) for making decisions. 
• A decision making function, which determines an action a to perform on the 
basis of current beliefs. 
3. Making Decisions under Uncertainties 
The belief of an intelligent agent is constantly updating over time, and ceases 
to update at the point of making decisions. At this time t, the subject agent would 
derive a number function m[: lW ---+ [0,1] based on its belief <Pr'A , BIA> , which 
satisfies 
III (S) = {pr.~ (B~ (S» if S is a tocal element 
t 0 otherwise 
This number function is a Dempster-Shafer mass function [10, 7]. When the 
true state of world is known, it is easy for an agent to select the correct action. 
However, the more common situation is that the agent is uncertain about the state 
of the world, instead, it may use partial ignorance (e.g., the above m[) to 
represent the uncertainty of the states. 
Traditionally, belief functions (bel) and plausibility functions (Pl) can be 
used to explain the plausibility implied by the mass distributions [10]. For a 
proposition S (S<;;;;W), bel(S) gives the pessimistic estimation about the true state 
in S, pl(S) gives the optimistic estimation, and the difference pl(S)-bel(S) 
represents the residual ignorance. 
In this research, we hope to provide a compromise estimation rather than 
pessimistic or optimistic estimation. Function cJis called a compromise function 
if it satisfies the following conditions [6]: 
(1) It is probabi lity distribution, and 
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(2) Its value is just in [bel(S), pl(S)] for all S~w. 
If Sj, S}, ... , SF (F>O) are all focal elements of a mass distribution m, then one 
kind of compromise functions of 111, Cf,lI: 2 w ~[O, 1], can be defined as follows: 
F card(SnSk ) 
elm (S) = L: . /II(Sk) 
k=] card(c\ k ) 
for all s~2'1', where function card counts the number of elements in a set. This 
definition is the generalization of the pignistic probability that was used in the 
transferable belief model to handle uncertainties [11]. 
4. Related Work 
In our model, the fusion result at time t is a mass function. This result is quite 
different from the conditions made by Kreps [13], and Brafrnan and Tennenholtz 
[1, 2] in their decision models. Kreps assumed that the agent can use a numerical 
probability to model its belief. In opposition, Brafrnan and Tennenholtz used the 
complete ignorance condition to describe the current state. 
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and 
artificial intelligence [4 J. The standard frameworks for beliefs can be given by 
means of Kripke structures used in modal logics of knowledge and belief [5]. A 
Kripke structure for belief is a tuple (W, n, K], ... , KlI), where W is a set of 
possible worlds, new) is a truth assignment to the primitive proposition at world 
WE W, and the Kis are accessibility relations on the worlds in W. If we define 
Klw)={w' I (w,w')EKiL then Klw) describes the set of worlds that agent i 
considers possible in w. In this modal logical framework, the knowledge (also 
including common knowledge, and distributed knowledge) encoded by the 
standard Kripke structures is discussed. This modal logical framework has also 
been extended by Friedman and Halpern [3], in which they discuss knowledge, 
plausibility (a plausibility measure to each agent at each world), and time. 
In applications. it is always difficult for an IA to recognize the exact 
knowledge as described within the Kripke structures. 
5. Summary 
As mentioned in Section 1, the very difficult problem for an intelligent agent 
is to efficient use the information or messages, which come from multiple agents. 
The PDF approach, however, gives a two phases method for this problem: 
perceiving environment to generate beliefs, and making decisions based on the 
beliefs. The further research topic will be to extend the PDF to formalize the 
communications between subject agents and their observer agents. 
9 
1· 
1 
le 
is 
e 
:e 
z 
li 
f 
n t ~ ~ q PC ' l' 
113 
References 
I, R, 1. Brafinan and M, Tennenholtz, On the foundations of qualitative decision 
theory, Proceedings ofAAAI, 1996,1291-1296, 
2, R.I. Brafman and M.Tennenholtz, Modeling agents as qualitative decision 
makers, Artificial Intelligence, 1997,94: 2 [7-268. 
3. N, Friedman and J, Y. Halpern, Modeling belief in dynamic systems, part I: 
foundations, Artificial Intelligence, 1997, 95(2): 257-316. 
4. P. Gardenfors, Knowledge in Flux: modeling the dynamics of epistemic states, 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988. 
5. I, Y. Halpern and Y. Moses, A guide to completeness and complexity for 
modal logics of knowledge and belief, Artificial Intelligence, 1992, 54: 
319-379. 
6. Y. Li and L. Liu, "Making decisions for intelligent agents in procedure 
descriptive framework", IEEE International Conference on System, Man, 
and Cybernetics, 200 1,3324-3329. 
7~ Y.Li and C. Zhang, Perceiving environ-ments for Intelligent Agents, 
Proceedings of 6th Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence, Melbourne, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 1886, 
Springer-Verlag, 2000, 297-307. 
8. Y. Li, C. Zhang, and I. R. Swan, An information filtering model on the Web 
and its application in IobAgent, Knowledge-based Systems, 2000, 13(5): 
285-296. 
9. A. S. Rao and M. P. Georgeff, Deliberation and its role in the formation of 
intentions, Proceedings 7th Annual Conference on Uncertainty Artificial 
Intelligence, Los Angeles, CA, 1991. 
10. G. Shafer, A mathematical theory of evidence, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 1976. 
! l. P. Smets and R. Kennes, The transferable belief model, Artificial 
Intelligence, 1994,66: 191-234. 
12. M. Wooldridge, Intelligent Agents, Multi-agent systems: a modern approach 
to distributed artificial intelligence, edited by G. Weiss, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1999, 27-77. 
13. D. M. Kreps, Notes on the theory of choice, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. 
14. A. S. Rao and M. P. Georgeff, An abstract architecture for rational agents, 
Proceedings of 3rd Principle of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, 
Cambridge, Ma, 1992,439-449. 
IS. S. J. Rosenschein and L. P, Kaelbling, A situated view of representation and 
control, ArtificialIntelligence, 1995, 73: 149-174. 
16. Y. Shoham, Agent-oriented programming, ArtijlcialIntelligence, 1993, 60: 
51-92. 
17. R. H. Thomason, Towards a logical theory of practical reasoning, AAAI 
Spring Symposium on Reasoning About Mental States,' Formal Theories 
and Applications, 1993. 
